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Introduction
The present paper analyzes urban worker and teacher union labor protests between 1967 and 1968 in El
Salvador. It also describes the strategies that the State, the security forces, and the paramilitary organizations
implemented in response to those protests. Numerous studies analyze the way in which security forces and
paramilitary groups responded to the protests and popular movements, emphasizing the challenge that guerillas
had posed to the state since the mid-1970s. This paper takes issue with this perspective because, although
guerrillas first arose in 1970 and became recognized in 1972, it is possible to detect a counterinsurgency
structure in El Salvador as early as 1963 and a change in its function in 1967. This paper highlights the use of
this counterinsurgency structure from its origins in 1963 to the protest wave that occurred from 1967 to 1968;
that is, several years before the emergence of the guerrilla organizations. In this sense, the paper emphasizes
the idea that the status quo was threatened by said mobilization before guerillas decided to take up arms.
This fact must be linked to the characteristics of the social and political ties between the unions and teacher
organizations that led the protests.
El Salvador: The “glorious” years
In the early 1960s, the Salvadoran production system was modified significantly which produced grave social
and political consequences. The international context was characterized by strong pressure towards industrialization
and political liberalization. Within this context, the military that had seized power in El Salvador in 1948
implemented a break with the previous period (1932-1948), which was characterized by repressive and reactionary
governments that defended the interests of the traditional oligarchy of the coffee industry.1 The military implemented
economic and political modernization measures aligned with post-second world war ideas. Their government was
characterized by a certain amount of political openness. However, they continued to repress El Salvador’s citizens.
Other changes were reflected in a new legal framework. The 1950 Political Constitution expanded and redefined
the state’s role, allowing it to strongly intervene in the national economy. These new measures empowered the state
to promote industrialization and to allocate national resources towards infrastructure.2
However, the main consequences of this turn of events become evident in the 1960s. In this decade, before
the war between Honduras and El Salvador (July 1969), the MCCA (Mercado Común Centroamericano or
Central American Common Market) was working at its full potential. As a result of this commercial integration,
industrial and agricultural production, as well as inter-regional commercial trade, increased rapidly. This was
especially evident in more developed countries of Central America, such as El Salvador and Guatemala.3 This
is why the period between the mid-1950s and mid-1970s is known in this region as the “20 Glorious Years.” 4
Successful economic integration promoted by the military resulted in meaningful economic growth. The
benefits of this growth impacted each social sector differently. Thus, these benefits were concentrated mostly
in the wealthiest economic classes. They also allowed the middle and working classes to rise, but they did not
generate any meaningful changes for the poorest groups.5 The most significant industrial development in El
Salvador took place between 1962 and 1966.6 Though the number of industrial employees was low, they were
important actors in the government’s development plan. Therefore, it was fundamental to create policies for this
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sector. This period was also characterized by cultural modernization, an increases in public expenditure, growth
of the Salvadoran state apparatus, political openness, and decreases in state repression. This promoted middle
class growth (made up by teachers, professors, professionals, technicians, and students) and also facilitated the
formation of unions, confederations, and associations in this sector.7
Coupled with these events, electoral reform in 1963 changed the political atmosphere.8 This reform
redefined the single-party electoral system that had been active since 1932. Many opposition parties achieved
legal status and won seats in the Legislative Assembly.9 This promoted a period of growth for the legal political
opposition until it reached its height in 1968.10 The 1960s, and particularly the presidency of Julio Rivera
(1962-1967), advanced the enforcement and enactment of basic labor rights (such as the right to join a union
and to constitute associations among public and urban workers). By contrast, the Labor Code, approved in
1963, strongly limited protest actions.11
The installment of a counterinsurgency structure in the countryside
The rural area presented an entirely different situation than that in the cities. The rural workers did
not enjoy any of the aforementioned benefits. Salaries remained low and unions were forbidden. In fact, it
was in the rural area where, in 1963, the counterinsurgency infrastructure was installed. Despite the fact
that it had been run and financially supported by the United States in its beginnings, the counterinsurgency
infrastructure functioned in accordance with the local government goals. That is to say, it was oriented to
form a social base for the pro-government party rather than to strictly follow counterinsurgency principals.
The installation of a counterinsurgency infrastructure was linked to a shift in US foreign policy towards
Central America.12 Thus, there were marked increases in the assistance and training of Salvadoran police and
security forces. In addition, national security issues were deepened, including the preparation of strategies for
possible counterinsurgency warfare. According to counterinsurgency guidelines, strategies should include:
1. the development of a military intelligence system;
2. the training of Central American armed forces for counterinsurgency warfare; and
3. an upgrade of available weapons and equipment.13
North American consultants arrived in El Salvador with those goals. While interventions by the United
States in matters of internal security were common, the emphasis on using and training local agents was
new. They wanted to turn local agents into efficient and collaborative forces. By doing so, consultants from
the US sought to reduce marine invasions, which were frequently implemented in other Central American
countries.14
Soon after, the members of the National Guard, a militarized police organization, were included in
this training. The National Guard had developed strong ties with local landlords, since its function was to
control the rural population. These landlords commonly supplemented the guards’ modest wages through
alternative forms of payment. Moreover, a command from the landlord was enough for a guard to arrest a
rural worker.15 In this way, the National Guard was a public organization that provided services for private
interests.
The training provided by the US gave them technical resources and methods that resulted in their
increasing importance in national politics. There was an additional prestige for those in the group: they
had access to military positions without having led a military career.16 They were extensively prepared and
had their own study centers and training schools. They were also involved in tuition programs for Ranger
trainings in Panama under United States Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) supervision. The benefits of
this training program were such that “Their members had 24 months of persistent training along with civil
studies so after completion they would receive a substantially higher salary than other organizations.”17
A year after the United States security program started training the National Guard, the National
Defense Organization (known by the Spanish initials ORDEN, which also means order) was founded.18
Although some of its members were National Guard recruits, civilians with no military experience formed
ORDEN’s largest group. The civilians were mostly compelled to join, and they did so because of promises
of land, affordable credits, supplies, permanent jobs, and healthcare. This was the only way to escape
poverty for many peasants and having the ORDEN credential would prevent them from being victims of
the repressive security forces.19 ORDEN managed to form an impressive control network and it mobilized
between 100,000 and 150,000 people in 1974.20
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Fig. 1. Opposition party PAR’s Flyer (1967)23. Source: Mexican ambassador’s report. From the Mexican
embassy in El Salvador. Acervo Histórico de la Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores de México.
Although they were trained in counterinsurgency techniques, they served initially to fortify the social
base of the pro-government party and the peasantry control, especially under Rivera’s presidency (19621967).21 It is not a coincidence that these types of functions started amidst a context of emerging political
openness and growth of opposition parties, along with the agitation and politicization of society.
This politicization responded to the possibilities opened by electoral reform in 1963. The left-wing
parties’ actions were an example. Although they knew it was impossible to win, they took the opportunity in
the pre-electoral context to develop broad political campaigns for “education and political awareness”.22 Some
of these campaigns tried to appeal to the rural population as shown in Fig. 1.
ORDEN essentially served as a tool to prevent the agitation of rural workers. The politicization of the
peasants was especially feared, since the inhumane working conditions in the countryside were the base of
the Salvadoran oligarchy’s wealth. Finally, ORDEN also secured the rural votes for the pro-government party,
given that the peasants were the majority population.
The cities: the beginnings of organizational infrastructure.
As a result of the new labor laws and political openness, many worker organizations arose in the cities.
Though some of these new worker organizations were independent and left-leaning, the pro-government
organizations experienced the most growth. In order to increase effectiveness in their fight, the independent
unions developed relationships with other similar worker organizations, creating networks. They thus
established an organizational infrastructure that would later be able to sustain a determined critique of the
political and economic order between 1967 and 1968.
Pro-government Unions
The military party supported a pro-government confederation -Confederación General de Sindicatos
(CGS)- since 1950, favoring them over other organizations. The military party that took power in 1948 had
decided to “take ideological and organic domain”24 of the union movement instead of eliminating it; the latter
course of action had been the most utilized strategy in previous presidencies.
Improving the working conditions in the cities was a central objective of the new developmental state
project (See Fig. 2), for evidence of the kind of dialogue between the president and pro-government unions
even during time of strikes). However, it was not desirable that independent and autonomous unions be the
ones to achieve this outcome. These unions were willing to push for concessions through the organization
of massive demonstrations and by increasing the participation of popular classes. But these methods were
considered too dangerous for the government.
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The dominance and heteronomy of the unions and popular classes’ organizations were key parts in
the authoritative, modernizing governments. They integrated the urban wage-earning sectors in a vertical
and authoritative structure. They sought to construct the social base of the pro-government military party
(called the Democratic Unification Revolutionary Party, PRUD, in the 1950s, and National Conciliation
Party, PCN, in the 1960s). They also controlled, disciplined, and obstructed the independent organization of
these sectors. To that end, the government promoted agreements with international organizations, such as
the Inter-American Regional Organization of Workers and the American Federation of Labor-Congress of
Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO). They not only advised union matters in an anticommunist way, but also
financed the pro-government unions. Thus, since its beginnings in 1958 the CGS constituted a very efficient
channel to add workers to the pro-government party.25 This confederation continued to grow through the
1960s, reaching a critical point in 1967 when it controlled most of the unions.
The independent unions
Along with pro-government union support, there was also a constant persecution of left-wing unions and
leaders. The independent strikers were discouraged. Belonging to a union that was not pro-government usually
resulted in being laid off. This had severe implications considering the limited jobs available in the industry.
The independent unions were centered in the Workers General Confederation of El Salvador (CGTS), which
was founded in 1957. This organization went through a restructuring phase in 1965, when it changed its name
to Unitary Federation of Unions of El Salvador (FUSS). FUSS was different from the pro-government unions
because they were autonomous and did not receive any funding or orders from the State or any international
organization, and they were not part of the official party. They also sought to overcome a corporate perspective.
The wide range of their demands facilitated collaboration with other organizations, constituting a significant
critique to the economic order. The autonomous nature of these organizations constituted a major challenge
for the military, especially since they were trying to implement a development plan. In these kinds of projects,
improving working conditions was desirable. However, the improvement was not to originate from autonomous
actors, but rather in a disciplined manner and under the control of the State.
Additionally, the capacity to articulate different demands constituted a problem for the government
as the military were trying to make a profound change in the relation between the State and the popular
sectors. The most common answer to the demands of popular sectors, the plain repression, was replaced
by a combination of repression, concessions, and co-optation of union leaders in the official party. Joining
wide sectors, the independent organizations undermined the bases that the pro-government party funded
through an expensive client network, and that were held
together through surveillance and regular control. Thus, the
government was forced to repress the sectors it was trying to
co-opt.27
The pro-government unions (CGS), in contrast, carried
out a different strategy. They looked for small improvements in
labor conditions that were fully in line with the government’s
authoritarian development program. Thus, they agreed with
the economic path that the military government established,
including the idea that a good relationship between capitalists
and wage-earners was possible and desirable. In light of
the growth of pro-government unions, the autonomous
organizations had to protect their independence and reinforce
their relationship with other unions and sectors. They are the
ones who constituted the organizational infrastructure created
during the political opening, which encouraged and supported
the protest outbreaks since 1967.
Protest outbreak (1967-1968)
Towards the end of Julio Rivera’s Presidential term (1962Fig. 2. La Prensa Gráfica Front Page 26. Source: 1967) and the beginning of Fidel Sanchez Hernandez’s time in
office (1967-1972), there was a series of large and successful
La Prensa Gráfica, 21/04/67.
strikes that were unprecedented in Salvadoran history.
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Fig. 3. Amount of Labor Strikes (1949-1972)28.
The workers were aware that after the politicization that characterized the electoral campaign period,
presidential weakness would occur—especially between the elections and the start of the new presidency.
Therefore, the workers realized that this was the right time to put pressure on the authorities. From 1967 to
1968 several successful strikes were carried out. The protests worth noting are:
1. the urban bus driver strike in January 1967 (organized by a union allied with FUSS, whose
demands resulted in salary increases and an 8-hour work shift);
2. a strike in the largest textile factory in El Salvador, called IUSA, in February 1967 (organized by a
CGS union that reached an agreement after an 8 day strike);
3. the strike action of garbage collection workers in February 1967 (supported by FUSS);
4. the protest organized by the workers of Acero SA in April 1967 (an important iron and steel
factory); and
5. the teachers strike that mobilized various sectors and unions in February 1968.
However, not all strikes and protests in this period were as successful as those listed above. For example,
the baker’s strike (September-October 1967) was organized by a union with a tradition of struggle and strong
links to the Salvadoran Communist Party (PCS). Unlike the rest of the strikes of the period, this strike did
not end well for the workers and it was not able to achieve its demands. In this period, such strikes were the
most common strategy of the independent unions. There is no doubt that the unions’ use of such tactics was
possible because of the strengthening of workers’ rights and the rise in union membership. The strike option
was also connected to the fact that the unions were mostly formed and based in the cities, around urban
working and educational areas. However, some of these strikes expanded across the entire national territory.
Certain scholars point out that in addition to how pervasive these strikes were in El Salvador, they were
characteristically pacific.29 However, as we can see, the most important strikes of the period (as the Acero SA
strike in 1967 and the teachers strike in February 1968) included disruptive actions from the workers as well
as from the organization of groups in charge of the workers’ defense.30
It is also important to note that the demands were directed toward the executive branch and the Legislative
Assembly. Mostly, they requested an increase in labor protections, or state intervention in a conflict within the
private sector. This was a way to put pressure on the government so it would implement reformist policies.
They also pushed for more swift recognition of the legality of strikes and broader protections against massive
layoffs. This shows that the government was perceived as a legitimate interlocutor. It also shows that workers
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accepted that the State could act on their behalf.31 These factors differentiate these strikes from those that took
place at the end of the 1970s. In the latter, the increase in state repression changed the relationship between
the government and the independent unions.32
The 1967 and 1968 strikes aimed to demonstrate the contradictions in the government’s actions, which
were characterized by the combined use of repression and concessions, as well as by an unclear relationship
with the business sector. Strikes managed to show clearly the evolving nature of the relationships between
the government and workers and between the government and businesses. As for employers, they created
the “Salvadoran Industrial Association” (ASI) in 1967. This shows that even though employers continued to
have influence over the executive power, they considered it necessary to constitute a group to defend their
interests.33 During these strikes, the independent unions reinforced two main characteristics: their autonomy,
and their capacity to articulate their influence into different sectors. These two characteristics made the unions
extremely dangerous to both the government and the most powerful economic sectors. These attributes
characterized the network of organizations capable of sustaining an important critique of the economic order.
The strikes of this period created a context where a new generation of political leaders learned how to use
contextually novel political and organizational resources. Those who constituted the first armed organization
of El Salvador, Fuerzas Populares de Liberación (Popular Forces of Liberation, or FPL), were among them.
Their leader was Salvador Cayetano Carpio, who was also the General Secretary of the PCS between 1964 and
1970. While he was General Secretary he strongly defended the union’s struggle and played a leading role in
the most important and combative strikes (like the strike that took place in the factory Acero SA). He left the
PCS in 1970 to found the FPL. This organization would later become the largest and most important one in
Frente Farabundo Martí de Liberación Nacional (Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front or FMLN).34
Due to their magnitude, researchers considered the 1967 ad 1968 strikes to be the pinnacle in the
Salvadoran union struggle, until 1977. In the mid-1970s, a new protest wave began and overshadowed the
legacy of prior movements, surpassing previous outbreaks in terms of size. The analysis of the 1967-1968
strikes was almost abandoned, and instead, many researchers dedicated themselves to studying the movements
of the 1970s. The similarities between the two processes were not fully analyzed and they were sometimes
underestimated.35
The 1967 and 1968 strikes signaled an interruption in the growth of pro-government unions36 and an
alliance between the independent unions.37 Thus, these strikes mobilized an already-established organizational
structure and marked the beginning of a new way of protesting. The relationship between different social
sectors included in that structure became stronger. These strong relationships would later be a key element
in the popular organizations that appeared afterwards, which were known as “mass fronts.” The ability to link
multiple sectors—an attribute of the unions analyzed in this paper—would be a characteristic of the mass
fronts.38 Union Leaders who had participated in the 1967 and 1968 strikes were among the militants who
founded the mass fronts in the mid-1970s. Later they became more aligned with armed organizations. The
presence of these leaders—who supported the armed struggle since the mid-1970s—modified the unions’
practices, orienting their goals toward revolution.39 It is worth noting that, Salvador Cayetano Carpio, the
FUSS leader, was the one who founded the first Salvadoran guerrilla unit, the Popular Forces of Liberation
(FPL). Melida Anaya Montes, the leader of the teachers union, was second in command of the FPL until her
death.
Political agitation and a new shift in counterinsurgency
When Sanchez Hernandez assumed presidency—in a climate of social and political agitation—a shift
in the counterinsurgency strategy was noted. Economic trends had changed: coffee prices were lowering,
cotton production was affected by drought and pestilence, and sugar stores were piling up unsold because
of the lack of external market demand. Unemployment was growing progressively and life conditions were
deteriorating.40 In addition, the MCCA had reached levels of saturation and social unrest was observed.
Complex subjects such as the agrarian reform had taken an unusual space in the press and in public opinion.41
Within the context of the labor conflicts, Sanchez formed a cabinet of ministers that combined some
progressive elements with strong guarantees for all the economic groups. Colonel Joaquín Saldivar, who had
served as the Vice Minister of Defense during the previous term, became the leader of the labor and social
security area, while General Fidel Torres, a person Sanchez trusted, handled the defense area. Days after he
assumed the position, the front page of the main Salvadoran newspaper ran the headline: “[The President]
alerts the police against subversion”. The article said:
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I encourage you to comply with your duties and to not pay attention to the subversion agents that attempt
to confuse the mind. I have heard these subversion agents telling members of the security forces to stop
obeying their bosses…This is an invite to break the morale of the security forces; it’s a subversion technique
to create chaos and take control of the country and democratic institutions42.

A few weeks after, an interview with the Minister of the Interior appeared in the same newspaper in an
article titled “El Salvador against totalitarianism.” There, he analyzed the conflicts that took place within the
first semester and had ended with the Acero S.A. general strike. In the article the Minister stated that the
conflicts were based on totalitarian doctrines against which they were struggling. He argued that undercover
agents led the protest outbreak.43 These statements regarding the communists appeared constantly in the most
important Salvadoran newspapers and they preceded a set of announcements that would constitute the shift
in the counterinsurgency strategy.
Sanchez Hernandez’s military training afforded him more of a counterinsurgency perspective than his
predecessors. This was evident through the importance given by Sanchez Hernandez to the Central American
Defense Council (CONDECA), a military integration organization. Unlike Rivera, who was scarcely inclined
to interfere in other countries’ internal matters, Sanchez had adopted North American counterinsurgency
techniques. He promoted the idea that since communism didn’t recognize geographic borders, the fight
against it shouldn’t recognize them either. He thus supported the regional fight against communism:
The revolutionary wars and the calls to national freedom…are part of a serious warning that can’t be
dismissed by the Salvadoran Military…the nature of the current conflicts requires that this government
supports the Central American armies’ unification to act against any aggressor.44

Another clear sign of the shift toward counterinsurgency was the empowerment of ORDEN, the
organization created during the previous presidency and financed by the United States. Sanchez removed a
large number of Rivera’s ministers and gave important places to the main members of ORDEN. Colonel Jose
Alberto Medrano stood out amongst them, most notably for his repressive actions; he would later assume the
central role in the “death squadrons.” Medrano also held a strong relationship with the US embassy and was
trusted by the president Sánchez Hernández. He was then appointed National Guard Director. It was at this
point when ORDEN extended its actions by incorporating the cities and reinforcing their repressive measures.
During this new stage of ORDEN, one of the first events that the organization participated in was the
teachers’ strike in February 1968. This event demonstrated that the training received at the beginning of the 1960s
by the United States was more useful for these types of actions than for regular peasantry control, a function
that had previously been fulfilled by ORDEN. A few months after Sanchez Hernandez took office, the teachers
strike was particularly challenging due to its magnitude. It managed to mobilize different social sectors. Among
them were the urban working sectors and middle class sectors (college and high school students, teachers, and
professor associations). There were peasantry associations as well.45
This widespread mobilization can be seen in the announcement
published a year later (see fig. 4).
Within this context, ORDEN was in charge of the
monitoring, kidnapping, and torture of the union leaders that
supported teacher protests. It is important to note that the
people who died due to the repression against the teachers strike
were not teachers but union leaders. They were members of the
independent federation of unions, FUSS, who had come to the
strike to support teacher demands. This demonstrated that the
most feared aspect of teacher mobilizations was their ability to
garner support from multiple areas.
Another sign marking the shift in the counterinsurgency
(and consequently the change in how worker protests were
dealt with) was the creation of the National Security Agency
(ANSESAL) in 1967. References to the communist threat had
Fig. 4. Teacher’s union announcement on consistently appeared in the national newspapers. On August
year after union leader assassination46. 30th, the headline of La Prensa Gráfica was: ”Subversive acts
Source: La Prensa Gráfica, 1/03/1969.
will combat [the Minister of] Defense” while an article titled:
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“Preventative plan by military authority” asserted:
The situation in the country deserves a special discussion considering the new subversive action that
constituted a threat to national sovereignty […]. A national action plan that would reject any insurrection
activity has been established.47

The article also mentioned that CONDECA approved plans to deter communist infiltration. But the
most important article that day was the one that announced the creation of the ANSESAL, the most important
organization in the Salvadoran armed forces. This article, titled ”Firm actions against subversion”, also affirmed
that Colonel Medrano would be its director. Another article, titled “Special Organization,” detailed:
Colonel Fidel Torres announced officially that there would be a special, new organization that would counter
effectively the subversive activities. The National Security Agency is run under Colonel Jose Alberto Medrano,
but at the same time it will function with the joint participation of the Defense and Interior Ministry, as well
as the special agents belonging to those ministries [...]. It is possible—said Minister Torres- that the OLAS
agreements will intensify the preexisting problems and create new ones. The agency will have the power to
compile and organize national and international information regarding subversion.48

The structure was completed with ANSESAL and ORDEN joining together. As it was pointed out, this
structure was created in 1963 in response to the counterinsurgency objectives, but was used in this way only
after the 1967-1968 waves of protests.
While ORDEN was in charge of the organization of the rural population and the repression of activists,
ANSESAL was a huge military network specialized in the collection, organization, and distribution of
information about perceived subversion. ANSESAL was formed by military personnel and constituted
an elite force that coordinated the intelligence services at a national level.49 Even though in the mid-1970s
there were more clear signs of its activity, ANSESAL was created at this time and immediately started to
gather information about the insurgency activity in the country. A 1983 report shows that 1 out of every 50
Salvadorans was an ANSESAL informant: “It works as the brain of a security network and reaches every town
or neighborhood in the country providing information and organizing the death squad’s functions”.50 The
effectiveness was shown by the decrease in strikes since 1968 (see fig. 3). After that, the union fighting would
decrease (between 1969 and 1971).51 The teachers’ strike in 1971 resulted in a temporary reactivation of the
mobilization, but it was only in 1977 that mobilization again achieved significant levels.
Conclusion
This article examines a period of Salvadoran history (1967-1968) that has not been fully analyzed. As
noted earlier, most studies of union mobilization dismiss this period and focus on the mobilization that
took place in the 1970s.52 Also, this article strives to characterize the role played by the State, marking the
different responses to the mobilizations by the government. The presidencies of Rivera (1962-1967) and
Sanchez Hernandez (1967-1972), which are frequently considered very similar because of their authoritative
character and their contradictory political “openness,” are differentiated. As this paper tries to demonstrate,
an important shift in counterinsurgency methods can be noted in the Sanchez presidency. That resulted in an
empowerment of the counterinsurgency structure and an important change in the way the government dealt
with social conflicts.
The article discusses three ideas that can be summarized as follows:
First, the detailed analysis of the protest outbreak in 1967 and 1968 revealed important characteristics
that differentiate it from the 1970s protest wave, marked by the increase in popular agitation, the emergence
of the armed organizations, and the deepening of the repression. In this article, these characteristics have been
summarized in two ideas: independence of the state and powerful groups (or autonomy), and the ability to
articulate different social, political, and geographic sectors. These features allowed the urban unions to sustain
a serious critique against the State’s economic program and the strategy of co-optation of the official party.
Secondly, the analysis of testimonies, secondary sources, and other documents of that period, allows
us to order chronologically the evolution of the counterinsurgency structure. Two different moments
were defined: the first phase (between 1963 and 1967) was characterized by the installment of the
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counterinsurgent infrastructure provided by the United States. Even though it was created by the US, it
responded to local objectives that were different from the North American counterinsurgent standpoint.
The second phase (between 1967 and 1972) was marked by emphasis on eliminating political agitation.
In this sense, this moment began the state’s counterinsurgency efforts. This is evident when the importance of
the information about a growing subversion that prompted the creation of ANSESAL. It was also evident when
they intended to provide the anticommunism struggle using a regional body, the Central American defense
organization (CONDECA), instead of instead of a national one. Researchers who have analyzed the political
repression during the period prior to insurgency operations in 1972 seem to accept that the presence of
counterinsurgent infrastructure was created because the guerilla’s threat was imminent. However, documents
and academic works written before 1972 note that in this period Salvadoran people mostly believed that there
was no possibility for the presence of guerrillas in the country because of the existence of a strong repressive
system in such a small territory.53
In this respect, this paper contributes insight into the debate surrounding the role played by the United
States in the counterinsurgent struggle in Central America. Thus, it is worth repeating that although the
United States definitely influenced the characteristics of the counterinsurgent structure in its beginnings, it did
not wholly define how this structure functioned once it was implemented. In contrast, the counterinsurgent
structure was aimed at resolving obstacles to economic modernization that were defined by a new generation
of Salvadoran military. Among those obstacles was the organizational network of middle and working class
sectors that had risen since the political opening in 1962. Therefore, the counterinsurgent structure aimed
to destroy and reconstruct certain social relationships that threatened the status quo, although they had not
yet opted for armed fighting. This is how the government tried to reorganize the social groups to be more
favorable to the new economic model.54
Finally, this paper attempts to demonstrate the different counterinsurgent measures that were available
to neutralize and eventually eliminate social mobilization as it was by the end of the 1960s. Although legal
unions supported the social mobilization (we should remember that until 1972 most of the armed groups
had not been created yet and the few that were functioning were not important), this mobilization placed the
political regime in a place of danger. This happened because, despite the political openness, this regime was
based on deep political and economic exclusion. What made the unions dangerous was not their adhesion
to communism, but the way they sustained critiques of the economic model. This modality is characterized
by its independence (or autonomy) and its ability to group together (or articulate) different social sectors.
Although the militants from the Salvadoran Communist Party participated effectively in these organizations,
the members of the mobilized sectors were more numerous than the members of this party. It was the breadth
and variety of support that enacted a change regarding previous political practices. It also constituted a serious
warning to the military governments and an unavoidable record for the mass fronts that would appear later.
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